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Abstract
We show that coherent risk measures are ineffective in curbing the be-
haviour of investors with limited liability if the market admits statistical
arbitrage opportunities which we term ρ-arbitrage for a risk measure ρ.
We show how to determine analytically whether such portfolios exist in
complete markets and in the Markowitz model. We also consider real-
istic numerical examples of incomplete markets and determine whether
expected shortfall constraints are ineffective in these markets. We find
that the answer depends heavily upon the probability model selected by
the risk manager but that it is certainly possible for expected shortfall
constraints to be ineffective in realistic markets. Since value at risk con-
straints are weaker than expected shortfall constraints, our results can be
applied to value at risk.
Introduction
In [3] it was shown that neither value at risk constraints nor expected short-
fall constraints are sufficient to curb the behaviour of a rogue trader or rogue
institution in typical complete markets.
In that paper a rogue trader was modelled as an investor who wishes to
optimize an S-shaped utility curve. This is an increasing utility curve that is
convex on the left and concave on the right. An investor with such a utility
curve is conventionally risk-averse in profitable situations, but risk-seeking in
loss-making situations. This idea is motivated by the theory of Kahneman and
Tversky [10] who observed such behaviour empirically. It can also be justified
theoretically by observing that traders have limited liability as they can lose no
more than their job and their reputation. Similarly shareholders in banks have
limited liability.
In [3] it is shown that subject to mild technical assumptions, in complete
markets, including the case of the Black-Scholes model, a trader with S-shaped
utility operating under cost and expected shortfall constraints can achieve any
desired expected utility, bounded only by the supremum of their utility function.
Moreover it is shown that the trader will take a position with infinitely bad
utility if that utility were to be measured with a conventional concave utility
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function. We will refer to such a utility function as the risk-manager’s utility
function.
The most significant assumption made in [3] is that the market is complete.
This paper seeks to ask how the results change if one studies incomplete markets
or other coherent risk measures (as introduced in [5]).
We begin by identifying why expected shortfall is ineffective in Section 1.
We give a formal definition of what we mean for a risk measure to be ineffective
in terms of whether it successfully reduces the utility that can be achieved by a
rogue trader. We show that coherent risk measures, ρ, are ineffective if and only
if they contain a specific type of portfolios which we call a ρ-arbitrage portfolio.
These are portfolios which give a potentially positive return for a non-positive
price without incurring a positive risk as measured using ρ. Our results in this
section apply to rather general markets, our key assumption is that the market is
positive-homogeneous, i.e. that unlimited quantities of assets can be purchased
at a given price. Our analysis show that the key fault of expected shortfall is
that it is a coherent risk measure, in particular it is positive-homogeneous. We
conclude that if one wants to use risk-measures that are effective one should
consider convex measures, as introduced in [9].
After Section 1 the paper focusses on expected shortfall. We will write ESp
for the expected shortfall at confidence level p. Our theory tells us that to
determine if ESp is effective we must look for ESp-arbitarge portfolios.
In Section 2 we show how this characterization of ineffectiveness allows us
to compute analytically whether or not expected shortfall is effective at a given
confidence level in certain simple markets. We first consider the case of a market
in assets which follow a multi-variate normal distribution, as considered by
Markowitz [13]. We next consider the case of complete markets. Our results
show that ESp arbitrage is unlikely in the Markowitz model for low values of p
but inevitable for all p in the Black–Scholes model.
In Section 3 we show how our characterization of ineffectiveness can be used
in practice for realistic markets. Using the techniques of [16], we are able to give
a practical numerical method for determining if ESp is effective. We demonstrate
this technique in practice by considering the market of European options with
a fixed maturity on the S&P 500. We find that the values for which ESp is
effective depend heavily upon the probability model chosen. We find for some
ostensibly reasonable fat-tailed probability models calibrated to market data,
ESp is ineffective for even very low values of p. In particular we found this for a
GARCH(1, 1) model calibrated to historic data and a mixture model calibrated
to option prices.
1 Ineffective constraints and ρ-arbitrage
We will begin by giving general definitions of a financial market. We wish to
give definitions that are broad enough to include incomplete markets where
there may be a bid-ask spread or even an order book. Our treatment is based
on that in [15], [14].
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A market consists of a probability space (Ω,F ,P) and function P mapping
random variables on this space to R∪ {+∞}. Each random variable represents
the payoff of an asset and P computes the price of an asset. A market is
positive-homogeneous if P(λX) = λP(X) for λ ≥ 0. Note that by requiring only
positive-homogeneity, one allows for a bid-ask spread. A market is coherent if
it is positive-homogeneous and
P(X + Y ) ≤ P(X) + P(Y ) (1)
P(1) <∞, P(−1) <∞. (2)
Assuming that a market is positive-homogeneous is an idealisation; for ex-
ample it implies that there are no quantity constraints. However, once one has
assumed positive-homogeneity, the assumption of sub-additivity (1) is rather
innocuous as one should be able to replicate the payoff X+Y by purchasing the
assets X and Y separately once one assumes there are no quantity constraints.
Assuming positive-homogeneity, equation (2) is the assumption that there is a
risk-free asset.
We use the term coherent simply by analogy with so-called coherent risk-
measures. We do not wish to imply that there is anything logically incoherent
about markets which are not coherent, the word is merely intended to convey
the uniformity arising from positive-homogeneity.
A trading constraint A is a subset of the set of random variables representing
the assets that a trader is allowed to purchase.
Let u˜(x) := x+. This can be thought of as the utility function of an risk-
neutral investor with limited liability. Any conventional concave increasing util-
ity function can be bounded above by au˜(x) + b for some a ≥ 0 and b ∈ R.
Moreover any S-shaped utility function of the type studies by Kahneman and
Tversky can be bounded in the same way. Because of these bounds and the
linearity of expectation, we see that if a any trader with a conventional or an
S-shaped utility function can achieve arbitrarily high utilities, a trader with
utility function u˜ can also achieve arbitrarily high utilities.
This motivates the following definition:
Definition 1.1 (Ineffective Constraint). A trading constraint A is ineffective
if for any cost C ∈ R
sup
X∈A,P(X)≤C
E(u˜(X)) =∞.
Note that we include negative costs in this definition. So under ineffective
constraints even heavily indebted traders with utility u˜ would be able to achieve
arbitrarily large utilities from their investments while at the same time clearing
their debts.
Definition 1.2 (ρ-arbitrage). If ρ is function on the space of random variables,
then a random variable is called a ρ-arbitrage if P(X) ≤ 0, ρ(X) ≤ 0 and X
has a positive probability of taking a positive value. If ρc assigns the value c > 0
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to any random variable which takes negative values with positive probability,
then a classical arbitrage is equivalent to a ρc-arbitrage. This justifies the name
ρ-arbitrage1.
Functions ρ on L∞(Ω;R) that are intended to measure risk have been studied
extensively, notably in [5]. They gave a set of axioms that ρ must obey for it to
be called a coherent risk-measure.
Definition 1.3. A coherent risk measure ρ : L∞(Ω;R)→ R satisfies
(i) Normalization: ρ(0) = 0
(ii) Montonicity: ρ(X) ≥ ρ(Y ) if X ≤ Y almost surely.
(iii) Sub-additivity: ρ(X1 +X2) ≤ ρ(X1) + ρ(X2).
(iv) Translation invariance: ρ(X + a) = ρ(X)− a for a ∈ R.
(v) Positive homogeneity: ρ(λX) = λρ(X) for λ ∈ R+.
We may now state our main theoretical result which connects the effective-
ness of a risk-measure ρ to the existence of ρ-arbitrage. Note that the axiom of
positive homogeneity plays a crucial role in our proof.
Theorem 1.4. Let ρ be a coherent risk-measure. If a coherent market contains
a ρ-arbitrage X then for any random variable Y of finite expectation
lim
λ→∞
E(u˜(Y + λX)) =∞ (3)
P(Y + λX) ≤ P(Y ) (4)
ρ(Y + λX) ≤ ρ(Y ). (5)
If risk free assets in this market have a finite price, then the constraint
Aρ,α := {Y | ρ(Y ) ≤ α}
is ineffective for all α. Conversely if Aρ,α is ineffective then the market admits
a ρ-arbitrage.
Proof. Let X and Y be as in the statement of the theorem.
Using the subadditivity of ρ, followed by its positive homogeneity, followed
by the definition of ρ-arbitrage we find:
ρ(Y + λX) ≤ ρ(Y ) + ρ(λX) = ρ(Y ) + λρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y ).
This proves (5). The same argument applied to P proves (4).
There is positive probability that X > 0, and hence a positive probability
that X+ > 0. So E(X+) = E(|X+|) > 0.
E((Y + λX)+) ≥ E(Y − + λX+) = E(Y −) + λE(X+)→∞
1We remark that a variance-arbitrage or a standard-deviation-arbitrage will also be a
classical arbitrage
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as λ→∞. This establishes equation (3).
To see that the constraint Aρ,α is ineffective, simply take Y = α. Then by
(3), Y + λX will give a solution of arbitrarily high u˜ utility which lies in Aρ,α
by (5) and which has a cost of less than P(α) by (4).
Finally let us assume that Aρ,α is ineffective. This implies that for all M
we can find XM ∈ Aρ,α with P(XM ) ≤ −α and E(X+M ) ≥ M . We see that
ρ(XM + α) ≤ 0 and P(XM + α) ≤ 0. If we take M = −α + 1 then E(X+M ) ≥
−α+ 1 so X+M is greater than or equal to −α+ 1 with positive probability, and
hence so is XM . Therefore XM + α is greater than 1 with positive probability.
We conclude that XM + α is a ρ-arbitrage.
The previous result shows that a ρ-arbitrage can be exploited by a trader
to obtain arbitrarily good utilities u˜. The next result shows how the same
portfolios perform when measured with typical conventional concave increasing
utility functions, which might be thought of as the utility function of the risk-
manager, the business overall or wider society.
Theorem 1.5. Let ρ be a coherent risk-measure. Let uR be any concave in-
creasing utility function satisfying
lim
λ→∞
uR(−λ)
λ
= −∞, (6)
If X is a ρ-arbitrage and not a true arbitrage, and if both E(|X|) and E(uR(−βY ))
are finite for some β > 0 then
lim
λ→∞
E(uR(Y + λX)) = −∞. (7)
Proof. Let α = β1+β , so that 0 < α < 1. Since uR is concave
uR (αλX) = uR
(
α(λX + Y ) + (1− α)
(
− α
1− αY
))
≥ αuR(λX + Y ) + (1− α)uR
(
− α
1− αY
)
= αuR(λX + Y ) + (1− α)uR (−βY )
Rearranging we find
uR(λX + Y ) ≤ 1
α
uR (αλX)− 1
β
uR(−βY ).
So, by our assumption that E(uR(−βY )) is finite, it suffices to prove that
lim
λ→∞
E(uR (αλX)) = −∞. (8)
Since X is not a true arbitrage, we may choose  > 0 such that P(X ≤ −) =
p > 0.
E(uR(λX)) = pE(uR(λX) | X ≤ −) + (1− p)E(uR(λX) | X > −)
≤ p uR(−λ ) + (1− p)E(uR(λX) | X > −)
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since uR is an increasing function. Since uR is concave, it is bounded from above
by a linear function, so u(x) ≤ a x+ b for some a, b ∈ R. Hence
E(uR(λX)) ≤ p uR(−λ ) + (1− p)E(aλX + b | X > −)
≤ p uR(−λ ) + (1− p)(a λE(X | X > −) + b)
= λp
[
uR(−λ )
λ
+
1− p
p
(
aE(X | X > −) + b
λ
)]
By (6) the term in square brackets will be negative for sufficiently large λ.
Equation (8) and hence equation (7) follow.
Even very mildly risk-averse utility functions will satisfy (6) for example the
function defined by
uR,η(x) =
{
−(−x)η when x ≤ 0
0 otherwise
satisfies (6) for any η > 1. Thus for any such uR, ρ-arbitrage opportunities give
unbounded upward potential for the utility of a rogue investor and unbounded
downward potential for the utility of a risk manager with utility uR.
Theorem 1.4 tells us that we can detect whether a given coherent risk mea-
sure ρ leads to ineffective risk-constraints in a given coherent market M by
solving the convex optimization problem
minimize
X∈L0(Ω;R)
ess inf −X
subject to P(X) ≤ 0
and ρ(X) ≤ 0.
Our assumptions on the coherence of the market and of ρ ensure that constraints
are indeed convex. The minimum achieved will be negative (indeed it will then
equal −∞) if and only if ρ is ineffective. Since this is a convex optimization
problem it is relatively straightforward to solve in practice.
2 Analytic results
We will write ESp for the coherent risk measure given by expected shortfall at
confidence level p [1]. This is defined by
ESp(X) =
1
p
∫ p
0
VaRp(X)dp
where value at risk at confidence level p, VaRp, is defined in turn by
VaRp(X) = − inf{x ∈ R : FX(x) > p}
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where FX is the cumulative distribution function of X.
In this section we consider the question of when ESp-arbitrage opportunities
exist in some simple markets where we can find analytical results. We consider
the contrasting cases of a highly incomplete and a complete market.
In section 2.1 we will consider the markets of normally distributed assets as
considered by Markowitz [13], this is a highly incomplete market. In section 2.2
we will consider complete markets. We will find that in the highly incomplete
market of normally distributed assets ES0.01-arbitrage is unrealistic. Whereas
in a typical complete market such as the Black-Scholes model ESp-arbitrage
should be expected for all p.
2.1 Normally distributed assets
We suppose that we wish to invest in the market of the Markowitz model. We
suppose there are N assets X1, X2, . . . , XN whose payoffs follow a multivariate
normal distribution with mean vector µ and covariance matrix Σ. A portfolio
represented by the vector α consists of αj units of stock j. The expected return
of this portfolio is µ>α and the variance is αTΣα. The cost of portfolio α is
assumed to be c>α for some vector c. So P is given by:
P(X) =
{
c>α when X =
∑N
j=1 αjXj
∞ otherwise.
We will suppose that, up to scale there is only one risk free portfolio.
This defines a coherent market which we will call a Markowitz market with
risk free asset.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose Φ−1(p) ≤ 0 where Φ is the cumulative distribution
function of the normal distribution. Then a Markowitz market with risk free
asset admits a ESp-arbitrage if and only either
g ≥ 0
or
i < 0
where g is the slope of the efficient frontier and i is the intercept as shown in
Figure 1.
Proof. A normally distributed asset X with mean µ and standard deviation σ
satisfies
Φ((−ESp(X)− µ)/σ) = p
hence
ESp(X) = −σΦ−1(p)− µ
So α represents a ESp-arbitrage portfolio if and only if
−
√
α>ΣαΦ−1(p)− µ>α ≤ 0 (9)
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Figure 1: The efficient frontier
and
c>α ≤ 0. (10)
By the classification of Markowitz markets in [2] we may assume without loss
of generality that
Σ =
(
1N−1 0
0 0
)
, c> = (0, 0, . . . , 0, 1), µ> = (g, 0, 0, . . . , 0, i)
where 1N−1 is the identity matrix of size N − 1 and g ≥ 0. So equations (10)
and (9) become
− (
N−1∑
j=1
α2j )
1
2 Φ−1(p)− gα1 − iαN ≤ 0 (11)
and
αN ≤ 0
respectively. If i < 0 we can always solve (11) simply by choosing a sufficiently
small value for αN . If i ≥ 0 then any solution to (11) must satisfy
−(
N−1∑
j=1
α2j )
1
2 Φ−1(p) ≤ gα1
and hence
−|α1|Φ−1(p) ≤ gα1.
The result now follows.
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So for an ES0.01-arbitrage to exist in a Markowitz market with positive
interest rates, one would require g > 2.32. This is an unrealistically steep
efficient frontier for investments over a time period of a year or less.
2.2 ESp-arbitrage portfolios in complete markets
We now consider the case of complete markets.
Theorem 2.2. Let M be a complete market given by an atomless probability
space Ω,F ,P equipped with a measure Q equivalent to P. We suppose that any
X ∈ L∞(Ω;R) can be purchased at the price
P(X) = e−rTEQ(X)
where T is the time horizon of the investment and r is the risk-free rate. This
market admits an ESp-arbitrage if and only if
P
(
dQ
dP
≥ 1
p
)
> 0
Remark 2.3. It already follows from the results of [3] that expected shortfall
is ineffective for any confidence level p in complete markets where the Radon-
Nikodym derivative
dQ
dP
is essentially unbounded. Thus the new result in Theorem 2.2 is the proof of the
converse. As was shown in [3], in complete markets such as the Black–Scholes
model with non-zero market price of risk, one should expect dQdP to be essentially
unbounded and hence for expected shortfall to be ineffective at all confidence
levels.
Proof. As described in [3], since the market is atomless we can find a uniformly
distributed random variable U such that the Radon-Nikodym derivative
dQ
dP
= q(U)
for some positive decreasing function q(u) of integral 1 over [0, 1]. (In the event
that dQdP has a continuous distribution we may simply take U to the the image
of dQdP under its own cumulative distribution function, the atomless assumption
allows us to find U in the general case).
It follows from the theory of rearrangements described in [3] that if an ESp-
arbitrage X exists, then there exists an ESp arbitrage of the form X = f(U) for
some increasing function f : [0, 1]→ R.
If X is an ESp arbitrage then so is X + ESp(X) (JA: Note sign has changed
since previous draft). To see this, first note that ESp(X) ≤ 0 and so
P(X + ESp(X)) ≤ P(X) +P(ESp(X)) = P(X) + |ESp(X)|P(−1) ≤ P(X) ≤ 0.
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Second we have by the axioms of a coherent risk measure that
ESp(X + ESp(X)) = ESp(X) + ESp(X)ESp(1) = 0.
Next note that ESp(Y ) ≥ (E(−Y )) which shows that a non-positive random
variable Y can only have an expected shortfall of zero if it is constant and
equal to zero. It follows that X + ESp(X) is either constant or has a positive
probability of being positive. But X + ESp(X) if and only if X is constant, and
X cannot be constant since it as an ESp arbitrage. Therefore X + ESp(X) has
a positive probability of being positive. We have now shown that X + ESp(X)
is an ESp-arbitrage as claimed.
It follows that we may restrict attention to looking for ESp arbitrage of the
form X = f(U) with f increasing and ESp(f(U)) = 0.
Given α ≤ 0 and β ≥ 0, let Ap,α,β be the set of increasing functions
f : [0, 1] → R which satisfy f([0, p]) ⊆ [α, β], f([p, 1]) ⊆ [β,∞) and which
have ESp(f(U)) = 0. We have shown above that the market contains an ESp-
arbitrage if and only if some Ap,α,β contains an ESp-arbitrage.
Define an increasing function g ∈ Ap,α,β by
g(u) =
{
α when 0 ≤ u ≤ p˜
β when p˜ < u ≤ 1
where p˜ ∈ [0, p] is chosen to ensure that ESp(g(U)) = 0. This requires
α
p˜
p
+ β
p− p˜
p
= 0
and hence
p˜ =
βp
β − α. (12)
Since f(u) ≥ β for u ∈ [p, 1] we compute that for f ∈ Ap,α,β
EQ(f(U)) =
∫ p
0
q(u)f(u)dU +
∫ 1
p
q(u)f(u)du
≥
∫ p
0
q(u)f(u)du+
∫ 1
p
q(u)βdu
=
∫ p
0
q(u)f(u)du+
∫ 1
p
q(u)g(u)du (13)
We may rewrite the first term on the right hand side as follows∫ p
0
q(u)f(u)du =
∫ p
0
q(u)g(u)du+
∫ p˜
0
q(u)(f(u)− g(u))du
=
∫ p
0
q(u)g(u)du
+
∫ p˜
0
q(u)(f(u)− g(u))du+
∫ p
p˜
q(u)(f(u)− g(u))du
10
But f(u) ≥ g(u) on [0, p˜], f(u) ≤ g(u) on (p˜, p]. Moreover q is also a decreasing
function. We deduce that∫ p
0
q(u)f(u)du ≥
∫ p
0
q(u)g(u)du
+
∫ p˜
0
q(p˜)(f(u)− g(u))du+
∫ p
p˜
q(p˜)(f(u)− g(u))du
=
∫ p
0
q(u)g(u)du+
∫ p
0
q(p˜)(f(u)− g(u))du
=
∫ p
0
q(u)g(u)du
since both f and g have ESp equal to zero. Using this we may obtain from
equation (13) that
EQ(f(U)) ≥
∫ 1
0
q(u)g(u) = EQ(g(U)).
Hence by definition of P, we have shown that for f ∈ Ap,α,beta
P(f(U)) ≥ P(g(U)). (14)
We deduce that if Ap,α,β contains any ESp-arbitrage then g must be an ESp-
arbitrage. This will be the case so long as β > 0 and P(g(U)) ≤ 0.
Let us now make the dependence of g on p, α and β explicit and write
gp,α,β(u) =
{
α when 0 ≤ u ≤ p˜
β when p˜ < u ≤ 1
We have
P(gp,α,β(U)) =
∫ p˜
0
αq(u)du+
∫ 1
p˜
βq(u)du (15)
where p˜ is given in (12). We note that
α =
(
1− p
p˜
)
β.
So we may rewrite (15) as
P(gp,α,β(U)) =
∫ p˜
0
(
1− p
p˜
)
βq(u)du+
∫ 1
p˜
βq(u)du
= −
∫ p˜
0
p
p˜
βq(u)du+
∫ 1
0
βq(u)du
= β
(
1− p
p˜
∫ p˜
0
q(u)du
)
(16)
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Viewed as a function of β, P(gp,α,β(U)) must be decreasing by (14). We also
note that
lim
α→−∞P(gp,α,β(U)) = limp˜→0+P(gp,α,β(U)) = β(1− p supu∈(0,1)
(q(u))) (17)
where we have used (16), the fact q is increasing and the fundamental theorem
of calculus. We deduce that if
sup
u∈(0,1)
(q(u)) >
1
p
then gp,α,β(U) will be an ESp arbitrage for sufficiently small α. Suppose we
have
sup
u∈(0,1)
(q(u)) <
1
p
then gp,α,β(U) will not be an ESp arbitrage for any value of α. If we have
equality
sup
u∈(0,1)
(q(u)) =
1
p
then the limit in (17) will be achieved for finite α if and only if q attains its
supremum on (0, 1]. Hence gp,α,β will be a ESp-arbitrage for sufficiently small
α if and only if this supremum is attained. The result follows.
3 Numerical results
In this section we will see how one can detect whether ESp exists in a realistic
market numerically. In 3.1 we will outline a general approach to detecting ESp
arbitrage. In 3.2 we will apply this to the specific case of options on the S&P
500.
3.1 Detecting ESp arbitrage numerically
Let us begin by introducing some notation. We will assume that there are NI
available instruments that one can invest in at time 0. The price of instrument
i is pi and the payoff at time T is the random variable fi(ω). We write p for
the vector of the prices of each instrument, and f(ω) for the random vector
containing all the payoffs. The investor chooses a portfolio containing xi units
of instrument i. We write x for the vector with components xi. To model a
bid ask spread, we require that each xi ≥ 0 and model shorting a security as
purchasing positive quantities of an asset with a negative price.
To find ESp-arbitrage portfolios, we seek portfolios of negative cost and
negative expected shortfall. Thus we will consider the convex optimization
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problem:
minimize
x
ESp(x)
subject to
cost constraint p · x ≤ 0,
quantity constraints 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ NI).
(18)
If the minimizing portfolio has strictly negative expected shortfall then it must
be a ESp-arbitrage portfolio. Note that we impose an upper bound constraint
on each xi in order to ensure that the optimization problem always has a finite
solution. Since one can always rescale an ESp-arbitrage portfolio, this additional
upper bound constraint is harmless.
To solve this convex optimization problem in practice, we may use the tech-
niques of [16]. Theorem 1 of [16] proves that
ESp(x) = min
α
Fp(x, α)
where we define
Fp(x, α) = α+
1
p
E(−f(ω) · x− α)+).
We next choose a quadrature rule for expectations with NQ evaluation points
Ωi and weights wi so that we can make the approximation
E(g) ≈
NQ∑
i=1
wi g(Ωi) (19)
for suitably well-behaved random variables g. We may then approximate the
expected shortfall as
ESp(x) ≈ min
α
F˜p(x, α)
where
F˜p(x, α) = α+
1
p
NQ∑
i=1
wi (−f(Ωi) · x− α)+.
Following [16], if we introduce auxiliary variables ui to replace the terms (−f(Ωi)·
x− α)+ we may approximate (18) with the linear programming problem:
minimize
α,x,u
α+
1
p
N˜Q∑
i=1
wi ui
subject to
cost constraint p · x ≤ C,
quantity constraints 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ NI)
auxiliary constraints ui ≥ 0
ui ≥ −f(Ωi) · x− α (1 ≤ i ≤ N˜Q).
(20)
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The simplest choice of quadrature rule is Monte Carlo. We simply simulate
points NQ sample points Ωi and give each sample point equal weight.
However, in the one dimensional case where the underlying is a single stock
price ST , if we know how to compute the integrals∫ p2
p1
p(ST ) dST ,
∫ p2
p1
ST p(ST ) dST , (21)
analytically, a better choice of quadrature rule can be obtained by first choosing
integration points S1 < S2 < . . . < SNQ and then selecting the weights wi such
that the quadrature rule is exact for payoff functions which are continuous and
linear except at the points S2, S3, . . . , SNQ−1. If the points Si include all the
strike prices of European puts and calls available in the market, then all possible
portfolio payoffs for European option portfolios will be of this form.
As we have seen, once we have chosen our quadrature rule we can find out if
a ESp-arbitrage portfolio exists by solving the optimization problem (20). We
can then use the method of bisection to find the lowest p for which ESp arbitrage
portfolios exist.
3.2 ESp-arbitrage opportunities on the S&P 500
We apply the theory of Section 3.1 to the market of European options on the
S&P 500. We consider by and hold strategies in exchange traded European
options on this index. We only consider portfolios where all the options expire
on the same maturity date and use this maturity date as the time horizon in
our computation of expected shortfall.
For every day in the week commencing 10 Feb 2014, we obtained bid and ask
prices for all the exchange traded options on the S&P 500 with maturity 22nd
March 2014 [12]. This data determines our pricing function P for a portfolio of
options.
We must then choose a probability model for the S&P 500 Index value on
the maturity date. We may then view the option payoffs as random variables
in this probability model, and this will describe the market in full. The idea of
studying this market is taken from [4].
The choice of probability model for the index value is subjective. We con-
sidered the following possibilities:
(i) A GARCH(1, 1) model for the log returns, calibrated to the same historic
return data. This was estimated using the MATLAB functions garch
and estimate. We then simulated 106 returns to obtain a Monte Carlo
quadrature rule for this model.
(ii) We calibrated a Q-measure probability model MQ given by a mixture of
two normal to fit the market volatility smile for the options and assumed
this was also the P-measure model. Mixture dynamical models have been
used under the pricing measure Q for smile modelling, see for example [6].
Mixture models have also been used under the measure P for portfolio
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allocation, see for example the work by Roncalli and co-authors [8, 11], or
for inclusion of liquidity risk in risk measures via random holding period,
see [7]. Our choice of a mixture model as both P and Q measure is not
intended to be a realistic approach to choosing a P-measure model, simply
an attempt to find a statistical model that is close to market prices to
discover whether ESp-arbitrage persists even when the P and Q measures
are very close. The fit of the calibrated model to the market volatility
smile is shown in figure 2. Because the integrals (21) can be computed
analytically for this model we were able to test whether ESp arbitrage
exists without using Monte Carlo quadrature.
The results are shown in Table 1.
Date GARCH(1, 1) run 1 GARCH(1, 1) run 2 Mixture
10 Feb < 0.01% 0.19% < 0.01%
11 Feb 0.29% < 0.01% < 0.01%
12 Feb 0.33% 0.39% < 0.01%
13 Feb < 0.01% < 0.01% < 0.01%
14 Feb 0.26% < 0.30% < 0.01%
Table 1: Minimum p for which there exists a textESp-arbitrage portfolio in
exchange traded S&P 500 options on the given data. For the GARCH(1, 1)
model, we performed two runs of the calculation in order to estimate the error
produced by the use of Monte Carlo quadrature.
Our results show that ESp-arbitrage opportunities can exist in real markets
for low values of p and with reasonable choices of P-measure model.
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